Suspicious Bootkitty Rootkit Component Drop under opt via File System

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-12
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the Bootkitty user-space and kernel components /opt/injector.so, /opt/observer, and /opt/rootkit_loader.ko. These fixed paths are dropped by the first known UEFI bootkit for Linux to load a kernel module and inject a shared object through the boot process. Their presence indicates a UEFI bootkit compromise.

Related detections9 linkedT1574.006 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Glupteba UEFI Bootkit EfiGuard Driver Drop to ESP (via file_event)
Malicious ld.so.preload Persistence Modification on Ivanti Connect Secure (via file_event)
Malicious Secure Boot Bypass Files Dropped to EFI Partition
Malicious Windows Boot Manager Backup Created by UEFI Bootkit
Suspicious Renamed GRUB Bootloader grubx64-real Creation via File System
Suspicious Dynamic Linker Hijacking via ld.so.preload Modification
Malicious Koske Userland Rootkit Installation via ld.so.preload (via file_event)
Malicious TeamTNT prochider Rootkit Deployment as Shared Object (via file_event)
Suspicious Bootkitty Rootkit Component Drop under opt via File System
Pivot detection · T1574.006 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.