Suspicious CanesSpy WhatsApp Mod C2 Beacon to AllRequest Endpoint (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-10
Updated
2026-10-10

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP POST requests to the /api/v1/AllRequest endpoint used by the CanesSpy trojanized WhatsApp modification for command-and-control. The spyware polls this path roughly every 60 seconds to receive orders and exfiltrate device identifiers, so traffic to this structured URI indicates an infected client beaconing to its C2.

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Suspicious CanesSpy WhatsApp Mod C2 Beacon to AllRequest Endpoint (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.