Suspicious Child Process Spawned by WinRAR.exe on Windows
Alerts when WinRAR.exe launches command, scripting, or proxy execution binaries on Windows.
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suspicious-child-process-spawned-by-winrar-exe-on-windows-146aace8
title: Suspicious Child Process Spawned by WinRAR.exe on Windows
id: 3ab8a777-dd44-465d-bab2-3678116a73bf
related:
- id: ec3a3c2f-9bb0-4a9b-8f4b-5ec386544343
type: similar
- id: 146aace8-9bd6-42ba-be7a-0070d8027b76
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where WinRAR.exe spawns execution-related child processes matching common LOLBin patterns (e.g., cmd.exe, PowerShell, mshta, regsvr32, rundll32, cscript, wscript). Such behavior matters because WinRAR activity is often abused as an initial execution vector to run arbitrary commands through spawned system interpreters and script execution binaries. It relies on telemetry that records parent/child process relationships, including ParentImage and Image/OriginalFileName fields.
references:
- https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cve-2023-38831-winrar-zero-day/
- https://github.com/knight0x07/WinRAR-Code-Execution-Vulnerability-CVE-2023-38831/blob/26ab6c40b6d2c09bb4fc60feaa4a3a90cfd20c23/Part-1-Overview.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_winrar_susp_child_process.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2023-08-31
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1203
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: \WinRAR.exe
selection_binaries:
- Image|endswith:
- \cmd.exe
- \cscript.exe
- \mshta.exe
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
- \regsvr32.exe
- \rundll32.exe
- \wscript.exe
- OriginalFileName:
- Cmd.Exe
- cscript.exe
- mshta.exe
- PowerShell.EXE
- pwsh.dll
- regsvr32.exe
- RUNDLL32.EXE
- wscript.exe
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creation events where WinRAR.exe spawns execution-related child processes matching common LOLBin patterns (e.g., cmd.exe, PowerShell, mshta, regsvr32, rundll32, cscript, wscript). Such behavior matters because WinRAR activity is often abused as an initial execution vector to run arbitrary commands through spawned system interpreters and script execution binaries. It relies on telemetry that records parent/child process relationships, including ParentImage and Image/OriginalFileName fields.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.