Suspicious Child Process of KeyScrambler.exe on Windows

Alerts on KeyScrambler.exe launching cmd.exe, PowerShell, script hosts, regsvr32, or rundll32 as child processes.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v2

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2024-05-13
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1203Exploitation for Client Execution
- T1574.001DLL
Persistence
- T1574.001DLL
Priv Esc
- T1574.001DLL
Defense Evasion
- T1574.001DLL
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process creation events where the parent process ends with \KeyScrambler.exe and the child process matches common script, command, and execution utilities. Such child processes may indicate attempts to extend KeyScrambler.exe behavior for persistence, execution, privilege escalation, or stealth. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry that includes ParentImage, Image, and OriginalFileName for accurate matching.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1574.001 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious Child Process of KeyScrambler.exe on Windows

Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

suspicious-child-processes-spawned-by-keyscrambler-exe-on-windows-ca5583e9

title: Suspicious Child Process of KeyScrambler.exe on Windows
id: 6883cd75-ec0b-442d-8aa7-81fa9074d661
related:
  - id: d2451be2-b582-4e15-8701-4196ac180260
    type: similar
  - id: ca5583e9-8f80-46ac-ab91-7f314d13b984
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation events where the parent process ends with \KeyScrambler.exe and the child process matches common script, command, and execution utilities. Such child processes may indicate attempts to extend KeyScrambler.exe behavior for persistence, execution, privilege escalation, or stealth. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry that includes ParentImage, Image, and OriginalFileName for accurate matching.
references:
  - https://twitter.com/DTCERT/status/1712785421845790799
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_keyscrambler_susp_child_process.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Huntrule Team
date: 2024-05-13
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.execution
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1203
  - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith: \KeyScrambler.exe
  selection_binaries:
    - Image|endswith:
        - \cmd.exe
        - \cscript.exe
        - \mshta.exe
        - \powershell.exe
        - \pwsh.exe
        - \regsvr32.exe
        - \rundll32.exe
        - \wscript.exe
    - OriginalFileName:
        - Cmd.Exe
        - cscript.exe
        - mshta.exe
        - PowerShell.EXE
        - pwsh.dll
        - regsvr32.exe
        - RUNDLL32.EXE
        - wscript.exe
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1

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