Suspicious Cloud Exfiltration via Rclone

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-16
Updated
2026-10-16

ATT&CK techniques

Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the rclone cloud sync utility with copy or sync operations, a data-exfiltration technique used by the Karakurt extortion actor to push staged files to attacker-controlled cloud storage. Bulk transfer of internal data to an external cloud provider is a strong sign of exfiltration ahead of extortion.

Related detections9 linkedT1567.002 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Data Exfiltration to Backblaze B2 via rclone (via process_creation)
Suspicious Rclone Exfiltration via Masqueraded svchost Process Creation
Malicious Snowflake Bulk Data Exfiltration via External Stage COPY INTO (via cloud)
Possible C2 via Google Sheets API Using Formula Render Option by GRIDTIDE
Suspicious Rclone Data Transfer to Cloud Storage (via process_creation)
Suspicious Microsoft 365 File Download with Scripting User Agent and Spoofed Office Client (via m365)
Suspicious Cloud Exfiltration via Rclone
Pivot detection · T1567.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.