Suspicious Cloudflare Quick Tunnel Establishment via trycloudflare.com (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-22
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects establishment of a Cloudflare quick tunnel referencing trycloudflare.com, an anonymous tunneling channel abused after React2Shell exploitation to reach compromised servers without exposing attacker infrastructure. Adversaries use these ephemeral tunnels to proxy command and control and remote access through trusted Cloudflare domains, so their presence on a server signals covert external connectivity.

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Suspicious UUID Named Pipe Created Consistent with Mythic SMB Agent
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Suspicious Cloudflare Quick Tunnel Establishment via trycloudflare.com (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1572 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.