Suspicious Cloudflared Tunnel Persistence Installed via msiexec (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-30
Updated
2026-10-30

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects msiexec installing the cloudflared Windows package, the covert-channel persistence step in the more_eggs TA4557 intrusion where a Cloudflare tunnel was stood up under ProgramData to reach the host without inbound firewall changes. Adversaries deploy cloudflared to proxy access over an outbound TLS tunnel, so an msiexec install of the cloudflared MSI on a server warrants investigation.

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Pivot detection · T1572 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.