Suspicious CMSTP Execution With INF Payload via process_creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-20
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Connection Manager Profile Installer cmstp.exe running with an INF file or silent flag, the LOLBin abused in the GST-phishing Remcos RAT chain to bypass UAC and execute attacker code. Adversaries leverage the trusted, auto-elevating cmstp binary to run malicious INF-defined commands while evading application controls, so its rare invocation is a strong signal of the multi-stage .NET infection.

Related detections9 linkedT1218.003 — drag to rearrange
CMSTP Execution of an INF Profile (via process_creation)
CMSTP UAC Bypass via Automatic Install Flag (via process_creation)
Windows: cmstp.exe Loading DLL/OCX from Suspicious Paths
Windows Network Connection from Cmstp.EXE (Outbound)
Windows: Command-line execution of cmstp.exe with INF install/silent/autobind flags (UAC bypass pattern)
Windows CMSTP UAC Bypass Attempt via Autoelevate COM Object DllHost Execution
Windows Process Access to cmlua.dll by CMSTP Connection Manager Profile Installer
Windows CMSTP Process Spawning Child Process
Windows Registry Events: CMSTP Execution via cmmgr32.exe TargetObject
Suspicious CMSTP Execution With INF Payload via process_creation
Pivot detection · T1218.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.