Suspicious COM Hijack via InprocServer32 Pointing to AppData DLL via registry_set

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1546.015Component Object Model Hijacking
Priv Esc
- T1546.015Component Object Model Hijacking
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a CLSID InprocServer32 default value being redirected to a DLL located under the user AppData directory. The Argamal RAT distributed through hentai games uses this COM hijack for persistence and stealthy code execution. A COM server pointing into a user-writable path is a classic hijack pattern and rarely legitimate.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious COM Hijack via InprocServer32 Pointing to AppData DLL via registry_set

Pivot detection · T1546.015 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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