Suspicious Command Shell Executing Batch Script from LNK Delivery

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.003Windows Command Shell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a command shell executing a batch script through the /c switch when launched from explorer, a delivery pattern observed in an EDR analysis of LockBit ransomware where a Documentos.lnk shortcut ran a batch file to stage the attack. It captures the shortcut-to-script execution that begins the intrusion. Detecting this is important because user-facing shortcuts launching batch scripts via the shell is a common ransomware and loader initial-execution technique.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1059.003 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious PIF Payload Assembly via copy /b Binary Concatenation

Suspicious DarkGate AutoIt3 Script Execution from C Test Directory

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Suspicious Command Shell Executing Batch Script from LNK Delivery

Pivot detection · T1059.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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