Suspicious Command Shell Spawned by lmadmin License Manager via process_creation

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- T1134.001Token Impersonation/Theft
Defense Evasion
- T1134.001Token Impersonation/Theft
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the lmadmin.exe license manager spawning a command shell or PowerShell, indicating post-exploitation of the Schneider Electric vulnerability including SeImpersonate Potato style privilege escalation. The license service has no legitimate need to launch interactive shells. A shell child under lmadmin points to exploitation and follow-on execution.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Command Shell Spawned by lmadmin License Manager via process_creation

Pivot detection · T1068 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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