Suspicious Compiler LOLBin Execution Spawned by Script Interpreter Parent (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-11
Updated
2026-11-11

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects trusted .NET build and install utilities being launched by a script interpreter parent, the loader pattern VIP Keylogger uses to run injected code through signed binaries such as MSBuild, RegAsm, InstallUtil, or vbc spawned from batch, PowerShell, or Windows Script Host. Adversaries leverage these compiler LOLBins to execute payloads under trusted Microsoft binaries, so this dual-use behavior warrants review in context.

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Suspicious aspnet_compiler.exe Execution from User or Temp Paths on Windows
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Windows node.exe Execution with -e/--eval and suspicious child process usage
Windows: Process creation involving VSIISExeLauncher.exe with -p and -a arguments
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Suspicious Compiler LOLBin Execution Spawned by Script Interpreter Parent (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1127 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.