Suspicious Compute Disk IAM Policy Modification Granting Owner Role via GCP Audit

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
gcp
Service
gcp.audit
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-23
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects v1.compute.disks.setIamPolicy operations that modify the IAM policy on a Compute Engine disk. Adversaries bind privileged roles such as roles/owner to an external principal to share a disk out of the victim project for data exfiltration. Granting broad access to a disk resource enables theft of the data stored on it without directly reading the volume.

Related detections9 linkedT1537 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Cross-Project Compute Snapshot Creation via GCP Audit
Suspicious EBS Snapshot Shared With External Account via CloudTrail
Suspicious Container Image Export via ctr in Cloud Model Exfiltration
Suspicious AWS Transfer Family Server Creation for Data Exfiltration (via cloudtrail)
Suspicious EC2 Snapshot Attribute Modification for External Sharing via CloudTrail
Possible Azure Storage Ransomware via Customer-Managed Key Encryption
Suspicious GCP Bucket Deletion for Namespace Hijacking (via gcp)
Suspicious Azure CLI Disk Snapshot and Copy for Data Theft
GitHub Audit Log: Repository or Organization Transfer Detected
Suspicious Compute Disk IAM Policy Modification Granting Owner Role via GCP Audit
Pivot detection · T1537 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.