Suspicious Consent to Application Grant in Entra ID

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-04
Updated
2026-11-04

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Entra ID audit events where consent is granted to an application. During the Midnight Blizzard intrusion analyzed by Wiz Research the actor consented malicious OAuth applications to high-privilege Graph permissions such as full_access_as_app, so unexpected consent grants can indicate an attacker establishing persistent mailbox and directory access.

Related detections9 linkedT1528 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Delegated Permission Grant to Entra Agent Access Scope via Azure Audit Logs
Suspicious Entra ID ROPC Authentication Bypassing MFA
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Malicious Azure AD Application Consent Granted with Mail Permissions
Suspicious Device Code Authentication via Microsoft Authentication Broker
Suspicious Microsoft 365 OAuth Authorization to Visual Studio Code Client
Suspicious Microsoft Entra Device Code Authentication Flow
Suspicious Google Workspace OAuth Authorization for Chrome Web Store Scope via Token Audit
Suspicious Service Principal Creation via Azure Audit Logs
Suspicious Consent to Application Grant in Entra ID
Pivot detection · T1528 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.