Suspicious Credential Added to Application or Service Principal in Entra ID (via azure)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-09
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects new password or certificate credentials being added to an Entra ID application or service principal, the persistence technique Silk Typhoon uses to abuse OAuth applications and service principals holding administrative permissions. Adversaries append their own secrets to trusted applications to authenticate as the app and access mail, OneDrive, and SharePoint through MSGraph, so unexpected credential additions signal a supply-chain identity compromise.

Related detections9 linkedT1550.001 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Credential Addition to Entra Application via Azure Audit Logs
Suspicious Salesforce Bulk API Export via aiohttp User Agent
Suspicious Entra Sign-In With Axios Automation User-Agent via AiTM Token Replay (via azure)
Malicious Azure AD Token Abuse via Roadtx
Suspicious M365 Sign-In from Synthetic iPhone User Agent via m365
Possible Illicit Consent Grant to OAuth Application via Azure AD
Suspicious Google Workspace OAuthLogin From Node.js Client via Tycoon 2FA
Suspicious IAM Persistence and Privilege Escalation Actions
Suspicious Credential Added to Application or Service Principal in Entra ID (via azure)
Pivot detection · T1550.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.