Suspicious Credential String Enumeration via findstr to Temp Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-16
Updated
2026-10-16

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of findstr to search files for password strings with output directed into the Windows Temp directory which Lorenz ransomware uses to harvest credentials from local files. Observed in NCC Group research unmasking Lorenz ransomware. Bulk searching for password keywords is a hands-on-keyboard credential-access behavior worth surfacing.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.