Suspicious Cron Persistence File Creation in System Cron Directories (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-05
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation or modification of files under Linux system cron directories that adversaries use for scheduled task persistence. In the Group-IB XMRig covert Linux PAM abuse campaign the miner establishes persistence through cron entries. Because cron persistence survives reboots and blends with legitimate scheduling, monitoring these paths helps surface unauthorized recurring execution.

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Suspicious Cron Persistence Installing a Downloader via Command Line
Suspicious Cron Persistence via etc cron.d tsar (via file_event)
Suspicious Cron Job Executing Binary From var tmp via Process Creation
Suspicious Cron Job Persistence Creation on Linux (via process_creation)
Suspicious Cron Persistence File Created in System Cron Directories
Linux eBPF Backdoor File Persistence via cron.d and sudoers.d (ebpfbackdoor)
Suspicious Cron Persistence File Creation in System Cron Directories (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1053.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.