Suspicious Data Exfiltration Channel to Telegram or Discord via dns_query

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
dns_query
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-16
Updated
2026-09-16

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects DNS queries to Telegram and Discord API endpoints from processes that are not standard messaging or browser clients, a command-and-control and exfiltration pattern used by STEALC and other information stealers. Attackers abuse these popular platforms to blend malicious traffic with legitimate service usage. Resolution of these domains by unexpected processes warrants investigation.

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Suspicious Data Exfiltration Channel to Telegram or Discord via dns_query
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.