Suspicious DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe (via security)
This rule detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be leveraged to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled.
SigmamediumWindowsv1
sigma
suspicious-dcerpc-smb-spoolss-named-pipe-via-security
title: Suspicious DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe (via security)
id: 9eae542f-5867-5513-8d2c-70ddea6a6933
status: stable
description: This rule detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be leveraged to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/
- https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1
- https://dirkjanm.io/a-different-way-of-abusing-zerologon/
- https://twitter.com/_dirkjan/status/1309214379003588608
author: Huntrule Team
date: 2026-03-09
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5145
ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$'
RelativeTargetName: spoolss
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.