Suspicious Deletion of Terminal Server Client History via reg by UNC1549

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-12
Updated
2026-10-12

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects reg.exe deleting the Terminal Server Client history keys that store previously connected RDP hosts as observed in UNC1549 anti forensic activity. Attackers remove these keys to hide lateral movement targets from responders.

Related detections9 linkedT1112 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Registry Class Key Creation for COLDRIVER Persistence
Suspicious Modification of CloudFiles BlockedApps Policy via registry_set
Suspicious Disabling of Malicious Software Removal Tool via registry_set
Suspicious SmartScreen Disable via Registry Modification via registry_set
Suspicious HrServ Registry Command Channel under IdentityStore RemoteFile (via registry_set)
Malicious Microsoft Defender Disable via Registry by Key Group
Suspicious PowerShell Decoding Base64 Payload Stored in Registry
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via process_creation
Suspicious Remote Desktop Enablement via Registry By Ransomware
Suspicious Deletion of Terminal Server Client History via reg by UNC1549
Pivot detection · T1112 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.