Suspicious Direct etcd Database Access via etcdctl With Server Certificates (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-15
Updated
2026-10-15

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of etcdctl using the etcd server certificates and the local etcd endpoint to read or write cluster state directly. Post-exploitation of a compromised etcd in Kubernetes clusters abuses this path to bypass the kube-apiserver and its admission controls. Direct database access lets an attacker read secrets or inject resources with full control over the cluster.

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Suspicious Direct etcd Database Access via etcdctl With Server Certificates (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1552.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.