Suspicious DLL Download via curl to User Profile by Confucius Loader (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-25
Updated
2026-09-25

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Confucius LNK loader using curl launched from PowerShell to fetch side loading DLLs such as python313.dll and mapistub.dll into the user profile alongside a decoy PDF. Downloading these specific DLL names with curl is characteristic of the actor. The DLLs are then side loaded by copied system binaries.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.