Suspicious dMSA Membership Modification via msDS-GroupMSAMembership Attribute

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-01
Updated
2026-10-01

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Active Directory changes to the msDS-GroupMSAMembership attribute on a delegated managed service account, the self-referential membership manipulation at the core of the Huntress dMSA Ouroboros credential-extraction technique. Writing the dMSA object's own SID into this attribute lets it authenticate to itself and unlock credential extraction. Unexpected modification of this attribute is a high-confidence sign of the abuse chain.

Related detections9 linkedT1098 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Modification of msDS-KeyCredentialLink for Shadow Credential Abuse
Suspicious Local Administrator Account Addition via net localgroup
Malicious Kerberos Diamond Ticket Forgery via Rubeus
ScreenConnect Administrator Provisioning XML Written to Temp Directory (CWE-288)
Suspicious Rubeus Kerberos Abuse Tool Execution from Downloads
Suspicious Domain Admins Group Membership Addition via Net (via process_creation)
Malicious Account Added to Domain Admins via net localgroup
Suspicious Azure Key Vault Access Policy Modification
Malicious Cluster-Admin Role Binding Creation (via audit)
Suspicious dMSA Membership Modification via msDS-GroupMSAMembership Attribute
Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.