Suspicious dMSA Object Access with Migration AccessMask

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
- T1078Valid Accounts
Execution
Persistence
- T1078Valid Accounts
- T1098Account Manipulation
Priv Esc
- T1078Valid Accounts
- T1098Account Manipulation
Defense Evasion
- T1078Valid Accounts
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects access to a delegated Managed Service Account object with the AccessMask 0x20 that corresponds to the dMSA migration operation. The BadSuccessor technique reads and manipulates dMSA objects to hijack privileges of a preceding account. This object access pattern helps surface abuse of the dMSA migration workflow.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1098 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious ESX Admins Group Creation via WinRM Host

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Suspicious dMSA Object Access with Migration AccessMask

Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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