Suspicious DNS Queries Containing Base64-Padding Pattern (==.)

Alerts on DNS queries containing the base64 delimiter pattern '==.' consistent with encoded data in DNS.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v2
Category
dns
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2018-05-10
Updated
2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

C2 → Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule flags DNS queries whose query name contains the base64 padding pattern "==.". Attackers may embed encoded data in DNS query strings to obscure content during exfiltration or command-and-control. The detection relies on DNS query text telemetry and matches the specific substring indicator within the query field.

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Suspicious DNS Queries Containing Base64-Padding Pattern (==.)
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Changelog

v2
  1. v2
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  2. v1
    No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.