Suspicious DNS Queries to Secshow Open Resolver Scanning Infrastructure

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
dns_query
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-18
Updated
2026-10-18

ATT&CK techniques

Recon → C2
  1. Resource Dev

  2. Initial Access

  3. Execution

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects DNS queries associated with the secshow campaign that abuses open resolvers with crafted FQDNs encoding hex IP addresses, timestamps and amplification test markers. The activity maps and probes network infrastructure through DNS while blending into ordinary resolution traffic. Detecting these lookups exposes reconnaissance and DNS tunneling behavior tied to the secshow operation.

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Pivot detection · T1071.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.