Suspicious Domain Trust Discovery via Nltest

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-04
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the nltest utility enumerating domain trusts, a reconnaissance step performed after GoldMelody gained code execution through ASP.NET ViewState deserialization. Adversaries map domain trust relationships to plan lateral movement. While administrators occasionally use nltest, its execution from web-facing hosts is suspicious.

Related detections9 linkedT1069.002 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious SOAPHound Null Filter LDAP Query via security
Suspicious SharpHound Group Enumeration LDAP Filter
Suspicious LDAP Security Descriptor Enumeration via SD_FLAGS Control
Suspicious Delegation Discovery LDAP Search Filter via Bitwise OID
Suspicious Kerberoasting LDAP Search Filter for Service Principal Names
Suspicious Service Principal Name Discovery via setspn Query
Malicious Active Directory Enumeration via SharpHound or BloodHound (via process_creation)
Suspicious Group Discovery - Command (via process_creation)
Suspicious Domain Trust Discovery via Nltest
Pivot detection · T1069.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.