Suspicious DotNet Utility Spawned by Script Host for Process Hollowing via Command Line

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-20
Updated
2026-09-20

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects RegSvcs.exe or aspnet_compiler.exe launched by a scripting host such as wscript, cscript or PowerShell, an unusual parent-child pair the ProjFUD injector uses as a hollowing target for AsyncRAT. These .NET utilities have no reason to be started by script interpreters. Detecting the chain reveals code injection into a trusted signed binary.

Related detections9 linkedT1055.012 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Outbound Network Connection from msiexec.exe (via network_connection)
Suspicious Outbound Connection from tracerpt.exe after Process Hollowing (via network_connection)
Suspicious AddInProcess32 Outbound Connection after Process Hollowing
Suspicious microsoftedgeupdatecore Outbound Connection from Wrong Path
Suspicious RegAsm or AppLaunch Outbound Connection after Injection
Suspicious DotNet Utility MSBuild RegAsm RegSvcs Network Beacon Indicating Hollowing
Suspicious SearchProtocolHost Network Connection Indicating Process Hollowing
Suspicious Network Connection from fsutil or Defender Client via network_connection
Suspicious Execution of Dotnet Injection Target Utilities
Suspicious DotNet Utility Spawned by Script Host for Process Hollowing via Command Line
Pivot detection · T1055.012 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.