Suspicious Double-Extension PDF JavaScript Lure via WScript (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-21
Updated
2026-09-21

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Windows Script Host executing a file whose name uses a .pdf .js double extension, the lure format in the XWorm tax scam where Tax-docs-2023.pdf .js masquerades as a PDF. The trailing .js reveals it as a script rather than a document, and wscript execution launches the PowerShell downloader. This is the initial-execution stage of the campaign.

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Suspicious Double-Extension PDF JavaScript Lure via WScript (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1204.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.