Suspicious Edgecution Malicious Extension Load via Headless Edge (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-11
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Microsoft Edge being launched with a load-extension argument together with headless mode and a Recovery user data directory as used by Edgecution to run its malicious browser extension backdoor. Legitimate Edge sessions do not side load unpacked extensions in headless mode.

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Malicious Chrome Extension Sideload via --load-extension from User-Writable Path (via process_creation)
Malicious Chrome Relaunch Hijack by FlutterShell Backdoor on macOS (via process_creation)
Windows: Chromium-Based Browser Launched via Script Host with --load-extension
Windows Chromium-Based Browser Launched With --load-extension Flag
Windows ChromeLoader Execution via Scheduled Task and Hidden PowerShell Launch
Suspicious Edgecution Malicious Extension Load via Headless Edge (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1176 · 8 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.