Suspicious Entra ID Device Code Flow Authentication

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
signinlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-29
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Entra ID sign-ins performed through the OAuth device code flow which threat actors abuse in device code phishing campaigns to trick users into authorizing attacker-controlled sessions and obtain tokens for apps such as Azure AD PowerShell and the Microsoft Authentication Broker. Device code authentications with inconsistent user agent and location across a shared session are a hallmark of this phishing technique.

Related detections9 linkedT1528 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Token Request Using Microsoft Authentication Broker Client to Obtain Primary Refresh Token (via azure)
Suspicious Salesforce Connected App OAuth Authorization from VPN Egress
Suspicious M365 Device Code Authentication Flow via m365
Possible Illicit Consent Grant to OAuth Application via Azure AD
Suspicious Device Code Authentication via Microsoft Authentication Broker
Suspicious OAuth Device Code Sign-In to Authentication Broker via Tycoon 2FA
Suspicious Entra ID Device Code Flow Authentication
Pivot detection · T1528 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.