huntrule

Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Renamed Log Utility

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-29
Updated
2026-09-29
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects an execution using dellog and ClearLog arguments to wipe PowerShell and other event logs, an anti-forensics action to erase attacker activity. This was observed during SonicWall VPN exploitation intrusions. Clearing event logs destroys the evidence responders rely on to reconstruct the intrusion.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1685.005 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via PowerShell Invoke-Expression
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil (via process_creation)
Malicious Windows Event Log and Backup Clearing by BabLock Ransomware
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil
Malicious Security Event Log Disabled via wevtutil
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil (via process_creation)
Suspicious Mass Windows Event Log Clearing via PowerShell (via ps_script)
Malicious Event Log Clear Attempt - Wmi (via process_creation)
Malicious Event Log Clear Attempt - Command (via process_creation)
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Renamed Log Utility
Pivot detection · T1685.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.