Suspicious Event Log Clearing via wevtutil (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-15
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of wevtutil to clear Windows event logs which was observed being run in a loop over multiple log channels during a BitLocker ransomware intrusion. Clearing logs removes forensic evidence of attacker activity. Destroying event history hinders incident response and hides the actions leading up to encryption.

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Malicious Event Log Cleared Using Diagnostics - Via PowerShell (via powershell)
Malicious Clearing of Windows Event Logs (via process_creation)
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via wevtutil During Ransomware Activity
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Get-WinEvent ClearLog (Qilin)
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil on EC2 Host
Suspicious Browser History Wipe via RunDll32 ClearMyTracksByProcess
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via wevtutil (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1685.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.