Suspicious Executable Launched from Domain Netlogon Share (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-04
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of a binary located under a domain controller Netlogon share, a propagation method where RansomHub places scheduled tasks and payloads in the Netlogon folder to run on member logon per Group-IB. Adversaries abuse Group Policy and the Netlogon share to spread ransomware across domain hosts, so process execution from this path warrants investigation.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.