Suspicious Executable or Script Written to Windows Fonts Directory by FishMonger

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-23
Updated
2026-09-23

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of batch, executable or DLL files inside the Windows Fonts directory, a hiding location used by the FishMonger group when staging SprySOCKS loader scripts such as klelam00007.bat. The Fonts folder normally holds only font resources, so script and binary drops there indicate masquerading and artifact concealment. Detecting this anomalous write path is important because it surfaces staged payloads placed in a trusted system location.

Related detections9 linkedT1574.001 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Evasive Panda DLL Side-Loading via MonlamUpdate (via image_load)
Suspicious rnpkeys Execution from AppData for DLL Side-Loading (via process_creation)
Malicious MpGear.dll Side-Loading by Signed Host Binary
Malicious msedge_elf.dll Side-Loading from Public Libraries
Suspicious DLL Sideloading by hpreader Executable from Documents
Suspicious DLL Sideloading via EngineX Executable
Malicious Libcurl DLL Side-Loading by Paint Backdoor (via image_load)
Suspicious GHOSTPULSE DLL Side-Loading via Signed Binary
Suspicious DLL Side-Loading by Microsoft.Http.Api.exe via HTTPService.dll
Suspicious Executable or Script Written to Windows Fonts Directory by FishMonger
Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.