Suspicious Executable Run from IIS aspnet_client or Windows Tasks Directory via process_creation

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
- T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects process execution from the IIS inetpub aspnet_client folder or the Windows Tasks directory, staging locations abused by Ballistic Bobcat after exploiting internet-facing servers to deploy the Sponsor backdoor. Binaries running from these web-writable or system-hidden paths strongly indicate post-exploitation persistence.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Executable Run from IIS aspnet_client or Windows Tasks Directory via process_creation

Pivot detection · T1190 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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