Suspicious Executable with Double Batch Extension (via file_event)

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1036.007Double File Extension
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Strela Stealer delivery artifacts written with a deceptive double extension where a batch suffix is followed by an exe suffix to disguise an executable as a script. Files ending this way are almost always an attempt to mislead the user or analyst. Their creation warrants investigation.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1036.007 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious Double Extension PDF Executable via Process Creation

Windows Suspicious Double-Extension Execution via Parent Command Line

Windows File Creation: Suspicious LNK Double-Extension Targeted by Document/Image Prefixes

Windows File Events: Flag Files With Double Extensions (e.g., .docx.exe)

Suspicious Executable with Double Batch Extension (via file_event)

Pivot detection · T1036.007 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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