Suspicious Exploitation Callback to Dnslog Service (via dns_query)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
dns_query
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-13
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects DNS lookups for the dnslog.store out of band interaction service, which attackers query to confirm successful exploitation and command injection during mass vulnerability scanning. Enterprise hosts have no legitimate reason to resolve this canary domain, so such queries indicate reconnaissance or validated exploitation of an internet facing device.

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Suspicious Exploitation Callback to Dnslog Service (via dns_query)
Pivot detection · T1071.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.