Suspicious FatalRAT C2 HTTP Initial Submission Request (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-06
Updated
2026-10-06

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the FatalRAT command-and-control check-in, an HTTP GET to the initialsubmission path carrying windows_version and computer_name query parameters. This beacon pattern was observed in Operation SalmonSlalom against Chinese-speaking APAC targets. Detecting the structured check-in URI exposes active C2 communication from an infected host.

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Suspicious FatalRAT C2 HTTP Initial Submission Request (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.