Suspicious Federated Identity Credential On-Behalf-Of Token Flow via Sign-In Logs

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Lateral Movement

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1550.001Application Access Token
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
- T1550.001Application Access Token
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects token requests using the user_fic grant type against a federated identity credential, the on-behalf-of flow abused to let a compromised Entra agent act as a user without a stored secret. Attackers leverage federated identity credentials to obtain user-context tokens for AI agents and pivot into mailboxes and Teams, so this grant type is a strong signal of agent identity abuse.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1550.001 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious Salesforce Bulk API Export via aiohttp User Agent

Suspicious Entra Sign-In With Axios Automation User-Agent via AiTM Token Replay (via azure)

Malicious Azure AD Token Abuse via Roadtx

Suspicious M365 Sign-In from Synthetic iPhone User Agent via m365

Possible Illicit Consent Grant to OAuth Application via Azure AD

Suspicious Google Workspace OAuthLogin From Node.js Client via Tycoon 2FA

Malicious GCP Service Account Backdoor via serviceAccountTokenCreator Grant

Suspicious GCP Service Account Impersonation via GenerateAccessToken

Suspicious AWS Role Assumption via Cognito Web Identity

Suspicious Federated Identity Credential On-Behalf-Of Token Flow via Sign-In Logs

Pivot detection · T1550.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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