Suspicious File Download via bitsadmin Transfer by Medusa Ransomware

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-19
Updated
2026-10-19

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of bitsadmin with the transfer argument to download files through the Background Intelligent Transfer Service, matching tooling ingress used by Medusa ransomware operators per Unit 42. Adversaries abuse the trusted bitsadmin utility to fetch payloads while evading application controls which supports staging of ransomware components.

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Suspicious File Download via bitsadmin Transfer by Medusa Ransomware
Pivot detection · T1105 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.