Suspicious File Timestamp Manipulation via PowerShell (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1070.006Timestomp
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell setting both CreationTime and LastWriteTime on a file, the hallmark of timestomping used to blend a dropped payload in with legitimate files and defeat timeline analysis. Timestomping is an indicator-removal technique tracked in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report. Detecting these property assignments surfaces anti-forensic tampering with file metadata.

Reporting behind it

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PowerShell timestomping via file timestamp property and setter usage (Windows)

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Suspicious File Timestamp Manipulation via PowerShell (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1070.006 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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