Suspicious GitHub Actions Runner In Hidden Directory via Shell (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-28
Updated
2026-10-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a GitHub Actions runner script executing from a hidden dev-env directory on Linux hosts. Threat actors install self-hosted runners into concealed dotfile directories to blend the backdoor into normal developer tooling. Runner scripts executing from hidden directories indicate an attempt to disguise persistent access.

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Malicious NimDoor Loader Persistence via Masqueraded Google Updater (via file_event)
Suspicious Rename of Double-Extension PowerShell Script (via process_creation)
Suspicious GitHub Actions Runner In Hidden Directory via Shell (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1036 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.