Suspicious High-Privilege Microsoft Graph Application Role Grant via Azure Audit (via azure)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-03
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the assignment of high-privilege Microsoft Graph application roles such as AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All, Directory.ReadWrite.All, or RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory to a service principal, an escalation path into Azure highlighted by Red Canary. Granting these permissions lets an app rewrite directory roles and grant itself further access, making it a powerful and stealthy persistence mechanism that should be tightly controlled.

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Malicious GCP Service Account Backdoor via serviceAccountTokenCreator Grant
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Suspicious High-Privilege Microsoft Graph Application Role Grant via Azure Audit (via azure)
Pivot detection · T1098.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.