Suspicious IIS Worker Process Spawning Command Shell via Web Shell (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-08
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Persistence
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Priv Esc

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the IIS worker process spawning a command interpreter or WMI utility, a behavior consistent with the Phantom Taurus web shell loading IIServerCore inside w3wp.exe. Server-side web shells use the worker process to execute reconnaissance and lateral movement commands. Detecting this chain surfaces active exploitation of a public-facing web application by a Chinese-nexus APT.

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Suspicious IIS Worker Process Spawning Command Shell via Web Shell (via process_creation)
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.