Suspicious Infostealer Log Artifacts Written to Disk (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-18
Updated
2026-10-18

ATT&CK techniques

Collection
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the log artifacts victim_logs.txt and opsec.log written by AI-assisted malware samples analyzed by Unit 42, including a .NET infostealer and a Golang Sliver dropper. These operator log files record collected victim data and dropper activity, so their presence indicates malware staging harvested information locally.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.