Suspicious IntelAudioService Execution with StateRepository Arguments via SPECTRALVIPER

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-24
Updated
2026-09-24

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of IntelAudioService.exe with the specific appmodel, StateRepository and Service command-line arguments used to launch the SPECTRALVIPER backdoor. The behavior is linked to the OceanLotus (APT32) espionage operation that shifted from external to domestic targeting. Detecting this masqueraded launcher pattern is important because attackers use it to covertly start their implant and blend with legitimate audio service activity.

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Suspicious IntelAudioService Execution with StateRepository Arguments via SPECTRALVIPER
Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.