Suspicious Interlock Backdoor C2 Beacon to init1234 Endpoint (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-26
Updated
2026-10-26

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP POST requests to the init1234 endpoint used by the Interlock PowerShell backdoor for command and control. The Interlock ransomware operators register their compromised hosts by beaconing to this fixed URI. The specific init1234 path combined with the POST method reveals active backdoor communication.

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Suspicious Interlock Backdoor C2 Beacon to init1234 Endpoint (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.