Suspicious Keylog and Screenshot Files in windows-cache Directory (OtterCookie)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-10
Updated
2026-09-10

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Collection
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the collection artifacts 1.tmp and 2.jpeg inside a windows-cache directory, where the OtterCookie module stores keystroke logs and screenshots before exfiltration. These fixed staging paths and filenames are distinctive to the malware. Their appearance indicates active input capture and screen collection.

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Suspicious Keylog and Screenshot Files in windows-cache Directory (OtterCookie)
Pivot detection · T1056.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.