Suspicious Kubernetes API Exposure via kubectl proxy

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-30
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects kubectl proxy being launched with a listening port which exposes the Kubernetes API server through an unauthenticated local proxy. Wiz identifies this as a control plane initial access vector because the proxy forwards requests using the operator credentials without further authentication. This is important because binding the proxy to a reachable interface can hand full authenticated API access to anyone who can connect to that port.

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Suspicious Kubernetes API Exposure via kubectl proxy
Pivot detection · T1190 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.